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Abstract 
Urban and rural local authorities constitute the lowest tier of Zimbabwe’s multilevel system 
of government. These local governments have a constitutional “right to govern” that 
must be exercised within the constitutional, legislative and policy framework. Under the 
old constitutional order, the national government could supervise urban local 
authorities, for example by issuing policy directives to ensure that these authorities 
governed in a manner that enabled them to deliver on national and local goals. This 
article examines this supervisory instrument, the powers it gives the national 
government, its use in practice and its relevance under the new constitutional order. The 
main argument is that supervisory instruments, such as the power to issue policy directives 
to local governments, are necessary in any multilevel system of government. However, such 
supervisory powers must be balanced with the need for local autonomy, to allow local 
governments to deliver on their service delivery obligations and development mandate. 
Introduction 
Despite serious criticism with regard to the political and legislative process leading up to 
its adoption,1 Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution (the Constitution)2 has the potential to 
put the country on a path towards greater democratization and respect for human rights. 
One of the Constitution’s many new dimensions is that it provides for national, 
provincial and local levels of government, thus entrenching a multilevel system of 
government. Section 5 of the Constitution now makes clear that Zimbabwe has three 
tiers of government. The significance of this is that provincial and local governments 
have been elevated from being mere creatures of statute into tiers of government that 
may only be abolished by a constitutional amendment. Zimbabwe’s local government 
system, once regarded as a model on the continent, stands to benefit from this 
constitutional recognition. The Constitution goes beyond symbolic recognition of local 
government. In a provision that resembles a similar provision in the South African 
Constitution,3 it guarantees the “right” of a local authority to “govern, on its own 
initiative, the local affairs of the people within the area for which it has been 
1
 See W Zembe and CO Masunda “The global political agreement (GPA) constitution in Zimbabwe: A new people-
driven constitution or a misnomer?” in J de Visser, N Steytler, D Powell and E Durojaye (eds) Constitution-Building 
in Africa (2015, Nomos and Community Law Centre, University of Western Cape) 19. 
2
 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No 20 of 2013. 
3
 Constitution of South Africa Act No 108 of 1996, sec 151(3). 
2 
 
established”.4 The Constitution also provides that a local authority has all the powers 
necessary to do so. However, local governments must govern “subject to this 
Constitution and any Act of Parliament”.5 Local governments must therefore exercise 
their powers subject to supervision by national government, as provided for in the 
Constitution and any act of Parliament. This article examines a specific instrument of 
national supervision over local government: the issuing of national policy directives by the 
national executive, represented by the minister of local government (the Minister). It 
proposes a normative framework for the national supervision of local governments and 
then proceeds to examine the Minister’s power to issue pol- icy directives under that 
framework. The examination is carried out against the backdrop of the Constitution, 
which has redefined relations between central and local government. The article 
starts by considering the development of the normative framework. It then examines 
the law pertaining to the issue of policy directives and looks at a number of examples to 
explore how the Minister uses this instrument in practice, before offering 
recommendations and conclusions. 
 
Framework for the supervision of local government 
The literature on decentralization often emphasizes that the allocation of 
decision-making power to local government can have many positive effects. 
 
Bringing decision-making closer to communities enhances government’s ability to 
gauge the needs of local communities and serve them more effectively. 6  
Decentralization may also nurture tolerance across political divides, as it pre- 
supposes that different levels of government will take different decisions but will 
nevertheless have to work together.7 There are many more arguments that speak to 
the virtues of local discretion. However, the literature is also awash with 
expressions of caution: local discretion or local autonomy should be fettered in some 
way, as it could otherwise have negative consequences. For example, transferring 
taxing and spending powers to local governments may compound inequity: cities 
with buoyant tax bases can offer good services while rural local governments 
struggle to make ends meet and thus offer services of a lower standard. 8 
Decentralization has also been associated with the threat of corruption. It is argued 
that the creation of multiple decision-making sites, many of them removed from the 
scrutiny of national media and national institutions, can create a fertile ground for 
increased corruption.9 Notwithstanding the validity of these arguments, many, if 
not most, scholars of decentralization agree that decentralization should be 
implemented in a measured way and that national government should always retain 
                                                 
4
 Constitution, sec 276. 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 P Smoke Fiscal Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Review of Current Concepts and Practice (2001, UN 
Research Institute for Social Development) 6 at 8. 
7
 See DT Sisk Democracy at the Local Level: The International Idea Handbook on Participation, Representation, 
Conflict Management, and Governance (2001, The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) at 
74; J Siegle and O’Mahony “Decentralisation and internal conflict” in E Connerley, K Eaton and P Smoke (eds) 
Making Decentralisation Work (2010, Lynne Rienner) 135 at 141. 
8
 R Prud’Homme “The dangers of decentralisation” (1995) 10/2 The World Bank Observer 201 at 203; J de Visser 
Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa (2005, Intersentia) at 27. 
9
 Prud’Homme, id at 211. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
3 
 
a measure of oversight over the exercise of powers at decentralized level.1010 In 
other words, in any decentralization scheme, there will be a need for the national 
government to supervise local government. The dictionary definition of supervision is 
the “task of overseeing the activities and the conduct of another and making 
certain that everything is done correctly”. 11  National governments must exercise 
restraint when they do so because otherwise the benefits of decentralization may not 
be realized.12 What is required is a balance between the need for supervision and the 
need for local autonomy. 
 
Supervision of local government can be exercised in various forms.13  At least three 
forms can be distinguished: regulation, monitoring and intervention.14 The primary 
focus of this article is on regulation, since this is the form of supervision most 
relevant to this study. A general definition of “regulation” is the “promulgation of an 
authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism, typically a public 
agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance with these rules”.15 In the context 
of intergovernmental supervision, regulation refers to national government (or 
sometimes, provincial governments) determining legal frameworks, sets of 
parameters within which local autonomy can be exercised responsibly. 16  If the 
benefits of local discretion and the ultimate aim of decentralization, which is local 
empowerment, are to be realized, such a framework should take into account a 
number of factors. 
 
First, it should not extend to the core of how local governments must per- form the 
function in question but should be limited to framework legislation. A framework is 
defined as the basic, underlying structure to a set of regulations. 17  It is the 
determination of minimum norms and standards rather than the usurpation of local 
power through overly intrusive or detailed regulation. 18  Secondly, the framework 
should be predictable. Local governments should be able to anticipate the rules to 
which they are required to adhere and adjust their planning and budgeting 
accordingly. Continually changing the regulatory framework will jeopardize local 
government’s ability to achieve optimal service delivery. 19  Thirdly, differences 
                                                 
10
 See N Steytler and J de Visser Local Government Law of South Africa (2007, Lexis Nexis / Butterworths) at 5–15; 
de Visser Developmental Local Government, above at note 8 at 169–70; R Bahl “Implementation rules for fiscal 
decentralisation” (paper presented at the International Seminar on Land Policy and Economic Development, Land 
Reform Training Institute, Taiwan, 17 November 1998) at 8–9. 
11
 M Waite and S Hawker (eds) Oxford Paperback Dictionary and Thesaurus (2nd ed, 2007, Oxford University Press) 
at 934.  
12
 See UN Habitat International Guidelines on Decentralisation and the Strengthening of Local Authorities (2007) at 7; 
European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 15.X.1985. 
13
 N Machingauta “Supervision of local government” in J de Visser, N Steytler and N Machingauta (eds) Local 
Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A Policy Dialogue (2010, Community Law Centre, University of the Western 
Cape) 139 at 140. 
14
 Steytler and de Visser Local Government Law, above at note 10, chap 15 at 5; N Steytler “Introduction” in N 
Steytler (ed) The Place and Role of Local Government in Federal Systems (2005, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) 1 at 7. 
See Machingauta “Supervision of local government”, above at note 13 at 143. 
15
 R Baldwin, C Scott and C Hood “Introduction” in R Baldwin, C Scott and C Hood (eds) A Reader on Regulation 
(1998, Oxford University Press) 1 at 3. 
16
 See de Visser Developmental Local Government, above at note 8 at 170. 
17
 J Litvack and J Seddon (eds) Decentralisation Briefing Notes (1999, The World Bank) at 75. 
18
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19
 See de Visser Developmental Local Government, above at note 8 at 44. 
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between local governments should be accommodated in the framework. It is wrong 
to assume that all local governments have the same capability to comply with 
national legislation or face the same challenges. This is exactly why most countries 
divide local government into different categories on the basis of demographic 
features, levels of capability or even performance. Lastly, the subjects of the 
framework, ie the local governments themselves, should be consulted before the 
framework is determined, as they will ultimately be responsible for compliance. It is a 
good governance principle that, when a proposed decision may affect  an  institution  
or  an  organization,  the  interested  parties  must  be consulted.20  Consulting local 
governments on the framework will result in better quality laws and in local 
governments being better informed about them. 21  It has been argued that 
intergovernmental consultation has three basic elements. First, there must be an 
invitation to hear the views of a particular party. Secondly, there must be an adequate 
opportunity to submit considered views and, thirdly, the party inviting views must 
consider those views in good faith. 22  It is important that local governments be 
informed before a decision is made so that they will be aware of the risks and 
drawbacks of the decision to be made. 
 
The need for local government to adhere to nationally prescribed standards will come 
at a cost to local government. Therefore, compliance and implementation costs should 
also be considered when the framework is designed. A balance must be struck between 
the cost of compliance and the objectives of the framework. Confronting local 
authorities with sudden legal change that is costly to implement without paying 
attention to additional resources for those local authorities will compromise the 
viability of local governments.23  
 
After having prescribed frameworks within which local governments are to exercise 
their powers, national government generally monitors legal compliance and the 
performance of local governments. This is necessary in order to detect early signs 
of problems that may require more drastic intervention by the appropriate 
authority.24  
 
Intervention is the most intrusive form of supervision. 25  Depending on the 
constitutional design, decentralization schemes often involve mechanisms whereby 
the national government is empowered by the constitution or statutes to intervene 
in local authorities’ affairs in response to abject service delivery failures, security 
threats, major emergencies or serious legal compliance issues.26  For example, in 
South Africa, intervention may entail measures such as the issuing of a directive, the 
                                                 
20
 BC Smith Good Governance and Development (2007, Palgrave MacMillan) at 156. 
21
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 Steytler and de Visser Local Government Law, above at note 10 at 22–134. 
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 See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development “Reference checklist for regulatory decision-
making”, available at: <http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=128> (last accessed 
3 February 2017). 
24
 See Steytler and de Visser Local Government Law, above at note 10 at 260; Machingauta “Supervision of local 
government”, above at note 13 at 142. 
25
 Y Hoffman-Wanderer and C Murray “Suspension and dissolution of municipal councils under section 139 of the 
Constitution” (2007) TSAR 141 at 141.  
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takeover of municipal functions or the dissolution of a local government council.27 
Legislation must clearly provide when intervention is the appropriate step to take 
when supervising local government. When the legislation is unclear with regard to 
when intervention can be triggered, the disciplinary responses from the higher 
governments can be numerous.28 According to Azfar et al, in the case of Uganda, as a 
result of the fact that the central government does not back policies with sanctions, 
when a local government underperforms in a key sector, the disciplinary measures are 
numerous.29 They further state that the disciplinary responses range from suspension 
or dismissal of the responsible bureaucrat to investigation by national authorities.30 
Where there is no clear framework for when and how the central government may 
intervene, there is a danger that local autonomy will be undermined. 31  Local 
autonomy is promoted and protected if attention is paid to a number of matters. 
First, the legal framework for intervention should include checks and balances to 
protect local government against the abuse of intervention powers by senior 
governments. Integral to this would be mechanisms for improved monitoring, an 
early warning system and strengthened means for intergovernmental oversight and 
support measures. Secondly, the mechanisms used to intervene in local 
government must be reviewable in court, so that there is recourse for local 
authorities that are of the opinion that the intervention power is being abused. 
Finally, when the problems giving rise to the intervention have been resolved, the 
intervention must be terminated.32  
 
Having discussed a normative framework for the supervision of local governments 
with particular attention to the nature of an effective regulatory framework, this 
article now turns to the legal framework and practice in Zimbabwe. The following 
section will assess the Minister’s powers to issue pol- icy directives under section 313 
of the Urban Councils Act of 1995.33  
 
Supervisory powers of the minister responsible for local government 
The Minister has a range of powers and obligations under various local government 
laws. Key among them is the Urban Councils Act (UCA), which primarily regulates the 
activities of urban councils (local authorities or governments). UCA provides for 
national government, through the Minister, to supervise urban local authorities. 
The objective of this supervision by the national government is, among other things, 
to ensure efficient service delivery, curb and prevent corruption, and ensure that local 
authorities deliver on their development mandate. 34  Under UCA, for instance, the 
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Minister is empowered to “direct a council to reverse, suspend or rescind any of its 
resolutions or decisions if he or she considers that the resolutions or decisions are not in 
the interest of the inhabitants of the area, or in the national or public interest”.35 The 
Minister may also appoint investigators to enquire into the affairs of any urban local 
authority.36  Furthermore, under section 313 of UCA, the Minister may give councils 
directives of a general nature on policy which the Minister deems to be in the national 
interest. These policy directives are often used by the national government to ensure 
that the activities of local authorities are in line with national policies and objectives. 
The directives are binding and must be complied with expeditiously, even if the local 
council disagrees with them.37 A similar provision exists in section 155 of the Rural District 
Councils Act, which empowers the Minister to take similar action with respect to rural 
councils.38 While phrased differently and not discussed in detail here, much of what is 
discussed with respect to section 313 of UCA also applies to section 155 of the Rural 
District Councils Act. The wide discretion given to the Minister to supervise local 
authorities has generated much debate within the local government sector. The reality is 
that urban local  authorities are not delivering basic services efficiently and effectively.39 
This is attributed to a number of challenges, including the political and economic crisis 
in Zimbabwe.40  However, there are also scholars who attribute this failure to undue 
interference in local government affairs by the Minister.41  It is safe to say that the 
Minister’s power to issue policy directives is a controversial instrument in this respect. 
 
Assessing the power of the Minister to issue policy directives Section 313 of UCA provides: 
 
“(1)    Subject to subsection (2), the Minister may give a council such directions of a 
general character as to the policy it is to observe in the exercise of its functions, as 
appear to the Minister to be requisite in the national interest. 
1. Where the Minister considers that it might be desirable to give any direction in 
terms of subsection (1), he shall inform the council concerned, in writing, of his 
proposal and the council shall, within thirty days or such further period as the 
Minister may allow, submit to the Minister, in writing, its views on the proposal and 
the possible implications on the finances and other resources of the council. 
2. The council shall, with all due expedition, comply with any direction given 
to it in terms of subsection (1).” 
 
A number of features require closer scrutiny. First, the directive is issued to an 
individual council; what is the significance of that? Secondly, the directions must be 
“of a general character” and relate to policy. This is another aspect that defines the 
scope of the instrument. Thirdly, the directive may be issued if it is required “in the 
                                                 
35
 UCA, sec 314. 
36
 Id, sec 311. 
37
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38
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 See D Dewa, C Dziva and K Mukwashi “Exploring local governance challenges in Zimbabwe under the 
Government of National Unity era and beyond” (2014) 2/8 International Journal of Political Science and Development 
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national interest”, a phrase that deserves closer examination. Finally, the Minister 
must “inform” the council; what does this duty entail? A more detailed analysis of 
these issues will provide a clearer picture of how UCA envisages the Minister will 
use the power to issue directives. 
 
What  is  a  council? 
Section 313(1) of UCA provides that the Minister may give “a council” policy 
directives. It further states that the Minister may inform “a council”, when it is 
considered desirable to issue a directive.42 After the proposal, it is “the council” that 
must submit its views on the proposal. These views include the possible financial 
implications of the directive on “the council”.43 Finally, it is the relevant council 
that must comply with any directive given under section 313(1).44 Section 2 defines a 
council as a “municipal council or town council”. A local authority is another term 
used to refer to a municipal council, town council, district council or municipal 
board.45  It is evident from these provisions that the act intends that the policy 
directives are addressed to individual councils. This does not prevent the Minister 
from issuing policy directives to groups of urban local authorities or even to all urban 
local authorities. However, the Minister would have to ensure that each council in 
that group is engaged on the matter in terms of the provisions noted above. 
 
Policy directives of a general nature 
It was argued above that a supervisory regulatory framework must not be overly 
prescriptive about how local governments are to perform their functions. Rather, it 
must be limited to setting the framework within which local governments operate. 
Section 313(1) of UCA follows this approach when it provides that the Minister may 
issue “directions of a general character as to the policy [a council] is to observe in the 
exercise of its functions”. It is submitted that a directive “of a general character” may 
specify the processes or procedures to be followed by an urban council. It may 
relate to a policy that the urban council must observe when exercising its functions. 
For example, a directive of a general nature may establish the minimum standards 
required for service delivery, establish minimum standards for public participation or 
prescribe the minimum content of certain policies or laws to be adopted by the 
local authority. However, if a directive specified in detail how an urban council is 
to operationalize the delivery of services or if it dictated the detail of how a local 
authority is to engage its community, it would go beyond the permitted “general 
character” of the directive. Similarly, if it provided the exact content of a local 
policy or law, it would go beyond what is permitted. In short, it is submitted that 
section 313 of UCA does not permit the Minister to use the directive to replace a local 
authority’s decision with his or her own decision. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
41
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The meaning of national interest 
It was argued earlier that the regulatory framework governing local government must 
be predictable. A continuously changing framework would be detrimental to a local 
authority’s ability to achieve optimal service delivery.46 Section 313 provides that the 
Minister may give directions of a general nature on policy that the Minister deems to 
be requisite in the national interest. The “national interest” is a notoriously 
ambiguous concept for which there is no accepted common standard or definition.47 
Section 313 allows wide discretion; the implication of this is that it is difficult for 
local authorities to anticipate what circumstances will prompt the Minister to 
invoke the provision. This is a recipe for differing views between the Minister and 
local authorities. When central and local governments have different views on what 
is in the national interest, the central government may make decisions that may 
under- mine or compromise the autonomy of urban councils in the name of the 
national interest.48 It would have been better if UCA had specified the grounds upon 
which the Minister may invoke section 313. The phrase “as appear to the minister to 
be requisite in the national interests”49 makes it clear that the act intends to afford 
the Minister wide discretion. The national interest imperative is not formulated as a 
jurisdictional fact, ie dependent on the existence of verifiable facts, but is based on 
the Minister’s opinion. This will make it very difficult for anyone to challenge the 
Minister’s reliance on the national interest criterion. It is apparent from section 313 
that the act gives the Minister extraordinarily wide discretion to invoke this 
instrument. It is suggested that, based on the wording alone, this law impacts very 
negatively on a local authority’s “right to govern” in section 276 of the Constitution and 
that it ought to be reconsidered as part of the alignment of local government laws 
with the new Constitution. 
 
The duty to inform an urban local authority before issuing policy directives 
It was argued earlier that, when laws or policies affecting local government are 
developed, local authorities must be consulted as they will be required to 
implement these laws or policies.50 Section 313(2) of UCA provides that the Minister 
must inform the council concerned, in writing, of the proposal to issue a directive. 
Following the proposal, the council must, within a specified period, submit its views 
and the possible implications on the finances and other resources.51 This duty to 
inform entails that the Minister must provide the affected council with facts or 
information concerning the proposal. When making the final decision, he or she 
does not necessarily have to take the council’s views into account because the act 
does not refer to consultation or the consideration of the council’s views.52 When 
viewed in light of the considerations pertaining to supervision made earlier, this 
appears to be a short-coming in the text of section 313 of UCA. In addition, it is 
argued that this aspect is not in line with the new Constitution, which instructs the 
                                                 
46
 See de Visser Developmental Local Government, above at note 8 at 44. 
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 See id at 141. 
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various components of the state to work together under the umbrella of the concept 
“cooperative government”. Section 194(1)(g) of the Constitution provides that 
institutions and agencies of government at all levels must cooperate with each 
other. Furthermore, provincial, metropolitan and local authorities must cooperate 
with one another within their spheres, in particular by informing one another of and 
consulting one another on matters of common interest, harmonizing and 
coordinating their activities.53  While the Constitution may not explicitly require 
central government to consult local government, a purposive reading of section 
194 of the Constitution as a whole, together with other provisions of the 
Constitution pertaining to devolution, lead to the conclusion that the Constitution 
intended that central government consult provincial and local governments on 
matters of mutual interest. The text of section 313 of UCA therefore needs to be 
reconsidered. In addition, the application of section 313 must take into account 
these constitutional values. It is suggested that, notwithstanding the text of section 
313, a failure of the national government to inform and consult a council before 
issuing policy directives goes against the constitutional provisions surrounding 
cooperative government. 
 
Examining the use of the power to issue policy directives in practice 
The previous section examined the Minister’s powers to issue policy directives under 
section 313 of UCA. This section examines how this power has been used in 
practice. Particular attention is given to the ministerial directive on employment, 
issued in 2010 under section 313. 
 
Before September 2010, most local authorities in Zimbabwe were in salary arrears 
and were failing to deliver on their statutory obligations, including the remittance of 
funds (medical and pensions) to the responsible institutions. This had adverse 
consequences on the welfare of employees and service delivery at large. In response to 
this, the ministry wanted all salary arrears to be cleared by the end of the 2010 
financial year to allow councils to start the 2011 year with a clean slate. In a bid to 
rationalize employment costs and to ensure that a large portion of arrears owed to 
pension, medical and other institutions was reduced, Minister Dr Ignatious 
Chombo issued a directive on employment to all local authorities.54 The directive 
stipulated that no local authority was to employ any staff member at any level or 
grade, without the Minister’s written permission; local authorities were required to 
make representations to the Minister where compelling reasons existed for 
recruitment. The directive read: 
 
“It has been observed that most local authorities are in salary arrears to a varying 
extent and are also in arrears in the remittances of statutory obligations, which will 
ultimately affect the workforce. 
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It is the desire of the Ministry that all salary arrears are cleared by the end of this 
financial year to allow Councils to start 2011 on a clean slate. It is also expedient that a 
larger portion of statutory obligations owing is cleared. 
 
In view of this, the following directive is made in terms of [sic] 313 of the Urban 
Councils Act and Section 155 of the Rural District Councils Act. 
 
With immediate effect no local authority may employ any staff member at any level 
or grade, including casual or contract workers, without the written permission of the 
Minister. Where compelling reasons exist for recruitment these should be 
submitted, together with details of employment costs and the relevant revenue 
source, to the Minister for his consideration. 
 
This directive is not designed to hinder Councils in their operations but to rationalise 
the employment costs and the need to clear salary and statutory obligation arrears. 
  
This article will assess this directive against the backdrop of the provisions of UCA 
and the considerations that were discussed concerning the normative framework for 
supervision. In short, it will explore whether the directive is limited to setting 
standards, whether the use of the instrument was predict- able, whether differences 
at local level were accommodated, whether local governments participated in the 
formulation of the directive and whether implementation costs were considered. 
 
Was the directive limited to setting standards? 
The first question is whether this directive was of a “general character”, as pre- scribed 
by section 313 of UCA. It is argued that the directive went beyond the permissible 
“general character”. It required a specific act, namely written approval from the 
Minister, before a local authority could recruit. It is evident from the directive that 
local authorities were not only failing to pay salaries, but were also failing to comply 
with their statutory obligations. If the objective of the directive was to enable councils to 
start 2011 on a clean slate, the Minister could perhaps have proposed standards that 
promoted sound financial management. Alternatively, the Minister could have issued 
minimum standards for recruitment. However, the Minister opted to usurp each local 
authority’s power to appoint staff altogether. 
 
Was the directive predictable? 
The second question is whether the directive on employment was predictable. In other 
words could local authorities have foreseen this directive and could they have 
adjusted their operations perhaps to avoid it? An analysis of the background to the 
directive shows that there is no doubt that the national government had to use its 
supervisory powers to ensure that the challenges were addressed. The directive on 
employment included clear goals to ensure that local authorities met their statutory 
obligations and eliminated salary arrears. Hence, it can be argued that the directive 
was reasonably predictable. 
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Did the directive accommodate differences at the local level? 
The third question is whether the directive on employment accommodated 
differences at the local level. Not all local authorities displayed exactly the same 
level of compliance with their statutory obligations. However, the directive treated all 
local authorities the same. Even those local authorities that were paying their staff on 
time were required to seek the Minister’s approval before recruiting staff. It is argued 
that the directive should have differentiated between local authorities that were 
meeting their statutory obligations and thus did not have salary arrears and those 
that did not. If that distinction had been applied, the intensive monitoring and 
approval regime may have been appropriate. 
 
Were the local councils involved in the determination of the directive? 
The next question is whether local authorities participated in the determination of 
the directive on employment. In other words, were local authorities consulted before 
the directive was issued? There is no evidence to suggest that urban councils were 
consulted before it was issued. In fact, it seems that local authorities were not 
even afforded the opportunity, as required under section 313(2) of UCA, to submit 
their views on the proposed directive. Instead, the directive itself invites local 
authorities to apply to the Minister if they have “compelling reasons” to recruit staff. 
Urban authorities were thus not permitted to make representations on a policy that 
was going to have significant consequences for their operations. It is submitted that 
this runs contrary to the principle of cooperative government that is a key 
component of the Constitution.55  
 
Were compliance or implementation costs considered? 
The final question is whether compliance or implementation costs were taken into 
account before the directive was issued. The effect of the directive was going to be 
that no local authority could recruit personnel without the Minister’s written 
approval. In the event that there were “compelling reasons” to recruit staff, the 
directive required the relevant local authority to appeal to the Minister. Therefore, 
day to day recruitment decisions, essential to the operations of any local authority, 
were suddenly imbued with procedural rigour that required communication with the 
ministry in Harare. It goes without saying that the Minister could have foreseen that 
the directive would impose additional bureaucratic costs onto local authorities, 
diverting resources away from service delivery. In addition, the delays in filling critical 
vacancies would impact the local authority’s ability to discharge its functions. However, 
nothing in the directive suggests that these costs were taken into account or balanced 
in any way against the objective of the directive. 
 
In summary, the directive was not “of general character” as it effectively removed 
local decision-making authority and placed this with the Minister. Although the 
directive could have been predictable, it did not accommodate differences at the 
local level. There is also no evidence to suggest that local authorities were consulted 
before the directive was issued or that implementation costs were considered. 
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Is section 313 of the urban councils act consistent with the 2013 constitution? 
This article has argued that section 313 of UCA gives the Minister very wide powers 
and that the implementation of this provision in the case of the employment  
directive  is  a  sign  that  the  regime  for  supervising  local government does not 
balance local discretion with the need for central oversight. As the Constitution 
guarantees local authorities some measure of autonomy, it is also appropriate to 
judge section 313 of UCA and the manner in which it is implemented against this 
new constitutional framework. Section 2 of the Constitution states that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and any law, practice, custom or 
conduct  that  is  inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. 
 
As highlighted above, section 276(1) of the Constitution guarantees every urban 
local government the “right to govern” on “its own initiative” the affairs of its 
communities. It gives local governments “all” the powers necessary to “govern”, 
subject to the Constitution and national legislation.56 This provision recognizes the 
importance of the autonomy of local authorities.57 In the con- text of the South 
African Constitution, which uses very similar terminology, Steytler and de Visser 
argue that the use of the word “right” emphasizes that a local authority is entitled 
to govern the affairs of its own communities and that this entitlement can be claimed 
and defended in terms of the constitution.58 They further argue that the phrase “on 
its own initiative” marks the end of the era when municipalities were the 
implementers of national and provincial legislation and had no policy making 
authority of their own.59 While the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the 
supervisory powers of the national government, it provides values and principles 
which should inform how the national government supervises local authorities.60 
Thus, while other tiers of government may supervise the functioning of local 
government, this must be done without encroaching on the institutional integrity of 
local government. Section 265(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that, when different 
levels of government are exercising their  functions,  they must do so in a manner 
that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
another tier of government. 
 
Section 313 of UCA provides that the Minister may issue policy directives of a general 
nature. This entails that the Minister may not give directives that are specific, as they 
have the impact of unduly limiting the local autonomy guaranteed by the 
Constitution. This discussion shows that, in some cases, supervisory powers under 
section 313 of UCA are being incorrectly used, for example through the issue of 
directives that are not of a general character. It is suggested that this practice is 
inconsistent not only with UCA but also with the Constitution. Thus section 313 
may be declared unconstitutional. 
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Cooperative governance is a key theme of the Constitution, as are guarantees of local 
autonomy. The principle of cooperative governance requires that local governments 
be informed and consulted on matters that affect their activities and institutional 
integrity. This entails that the Constitution places an obligation on the national and 
provincial tiers of government to inform and consult local authorities on various 
matters which are of interest to local authorities, such as policy directives under 
section 313. Section 313 provides that the Minister merely has to inform the 
council concerned if he or she considers issuing a directive.61 Under the principle of 
cooperative governance, it is not sufficient merely to inform another state institution 
of a forthcoming policy, particularly when it has such significant consequences for 
that institution. It is suggested that the Minister must not only inform but also 
consult local authorities before issuing such policy directives. Hence, section 313 
requires alignment with the Constitution by reflecting the new cooperative governance 
dimension. 
 
Conclusion 
National government supervision of local authorities is important to promote the 
realization of national and local goals, such as the efficient and effective delivery of 
basic services. The Urban Councils Act gives the central government a wide array of 
supervisory powers. The issuing of policy directives is one of the instruments used by 
the national government to ensure that the activities of urban local authorities are 
in line with national policies and objectives. When exercising the power to issue 
policy directives, it is important that the national government does not violate a 
local authority’s “right to govern” as determined by the Constitution. The 
Constitution provides for devolution of power to local authorities to realize various 
objectives, including development and democracy. 62  The Constitution further 
provides for certain principles and values, such as the right of communities to govern 
their own affairs, institutional integrity of local government and cooperative 
governance.63 These principles and values signify that supervision of local authorities 
by the national government must be exercised within limits. Thus, it is important 
that the national government exercises its supervisory powers in a way that does not 
unjustifiably undermine local autonomy and accountability. This article has, 
however, established that the exercise of supervisory powers under section 313 of 
UCA limits local autonomy in a number of ways. The overall effect of these powers 
is that they undermine the autonomy of urban local authorities, as the Minister has 
unlimited supervisory powers that he or she sometimes exercises incorrectly. To 
strike a balance between the  requirement  for  supervision  and  the  need  for  local  
autonomy,  it  is proposed that the discretion given to the Minister under section 313 
be limited. First, the Minister’s powers should be limited to issuing directives of a 
general character or nature, as defined in this article. Secondly, the grounds upon 
which the Minister may resort to a policy directive should be clearly spelt out and 
made dependent on objectively verifiable facts. Legislation should also require local 
authorities to be consulted before the Minister issues policy directives, so as to give 
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local authorities an opportunity to make representations on matters that affect their 
interests. Lastly, it is recommended that the legal framework regulating the issue of 
policy directives makes it clear that the Minister is obliged to consider compliance or 
implementation costs before he or she issues a policy directive. 
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